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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 92-486
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UNITED STATES and FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, PETITIONERS v. EDGE BROADCAST-
ING COMPANY t/a power 94
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the fourth circuit
[June 25, 1993]

  Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court,
except as to Part III-D.
  In this case we must decide whether federal statutes
that prohibit the broadcast of lottery advertising by a
broadcaster licensed to a State that does not allow lotter-
ies, while allowing such broadcasting by a broadcaster
licensed to a State that sponsors a lottery, are, as applied
to respondent, consistent with the First Amendment.

                            I
  While lotteries have existed in this country since its
founding, States have long viewed them as a hazard to
their citizens and to the public interest, and have long
engaged in legislative efforts to control this form of
gambling.  Congress has, since the early 19th century,
sought to assist the States in controlling lotteries.  See,
e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1827, 6, 4 Stat. 238; Act of July 27,
1868, 13, 15 Stat. 196; Act of June 8, 1872, 149, 17
Stat. 302.  In 1876, Congress made it a crime to deposit
in the mails any letters or circulars concerning lotteries,
whether illegal or chartered by state legislatures.  See Act
of July 12, 1876, ch. 186, 2, 19 Stat. 90, codified at Rev.
Stat. 3894 (2d ed. 1878).  This Court rejected a challenge
to the 1876 Act on First Amendment grounds in Ex parte
Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1878).  In response to the persis-
tence of lotteries, particularly the Louisiana Lottery,
Congress closed a loophole allowing the advertisement of
lotteries in newspapers in the Anti-Lottery Act of 1890,
ch. 908, 1, 26 Stat. 465, codified at Rev. Stat. 3894
(Supp. 2d ed. 1891), and this Court upheld that Act
against a First Amendment challenge in Ex parte Rapier,
143 U. S. 110 (1892).  When the Louisiana Lottery moved
its operations to Honduras, Congress passed the Act of
Mar. 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 963, 18 U. S. C. 1301, which
outlawed the transportation of lottery tickets in interstate
or foreign commerce.  This Court upheld the constitution-
ality of that Act against a claim that it exceeded
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause in Champion
v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U. S. 321 (1903).  This federal
antilottery legislation remains in effect.  See 18 U. S. C.
1301, 1302.
  After the advent of broadcasting, Congress extended the
federal lottery control scheme by prohibiting, in 316 of
the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1088, the
broadcast of -any advertisement of or information concern-
ing any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme.-  18
U. S. C. 1304, as amended by the Charity Games
Advertising Clarification Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-625,
3(a)(4), 102 Stat. 3206.  In 1975, Congress amended the
statutory scheme to allow newspapers and broadcasters
to advertise state-run lotteries if the newspaper is pub-
lished in or the broadcast station is licensed to a State
which conducts a state-run lottery.  See 18 U. S. C. 1307
(1988 ed., Supp. III).  This exemption was enacted -to
accommodate the operation of legally authorized State-run
lotteries consistent with continued Federal protection to
the policies of non-lottery States.-  S. Rep. No. 93-1404,
p. 2 (1974).  See also H. Rep. No. 93-1517, p. 5 (1974).
  North Carolina does not sponsor a lottery, and partici-
pating in or advertising nonexempt raffles and lotteries
is a crime under its statutes.  N. C. Gen. Stat. 14-289
and 14-291 (1986 and Supp. 1992).  Virginia, on the other
hand, has chosen to legalize lotteries under a state
monopoly and has entered the marketplace vigorously.
  Respondent, Edge Broadcasting Corporation (Edge), owns
and operates a radio station licensed by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to Elizabeth City,
North Carolina.  This station, known as -Power 94,- has
the call letters WMYK-FM and broadcasts from Moyock,
North Carolina, which is approximately three miles from
the border between Virginia and North Carolina and
considerably closer to Virginia than is Elizabeth City.
Power 94 is one of 24 radio stations serving the Hampton
Roads, Virginia, metropolitan area; 92.2% of its listening
audience are Virginians; the rest, 7.8%, reside in the nine
North Carolina counties served by Power 94.  Because
Edge is licensed to serve a North Carolina community, the
federal statute prohibits it from broadcasting advertise-
ments for the Virginia lottery.  Edge derives 95% of its
advertising revenue from Virginia sources, and claims that
it has lost large sums of money from its inability to carry
Virginia lottery advertisements.
  Edge entered federal court in the Eastern District of
Virginia, seeking a declaratory judgment that, as applied
to it, 1304 and 1307, together with corresponding FCC
regulations, violated the First Amendment to the Constitu-
tion and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth,
as well as injunctive protection against the enforcement
of those statutes and regulations.
  The District Court recognized the Congress has greater
latitude to regulate broadcasting than other forms of
communication.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a-15a.  The
District Court construed the statutes not to cover the
broadcast of noncommercial information about lotteries, a
construction that the Government did not oppose.  With
regard to the restriction on advertising, the District Court
evaluated the statutes under the established four-factor
test for commercial speech set forth in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New
York, 447 U. S. 557, 566 (1980):
-At the outset, we must determine whether the
expression is protected by the First Amendment.  [1]
For commercial speech to come within that provision,
it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading.  Next, we ask [2] whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial.  If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine [3] whether
the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and [4] whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.-
Assuming that the advertising Edge wished to air would
deal with the Virginia lottery, a legal activity, and would
not be misleading, the court went on to hold that the
second and fourth Central Hudson factors were satisfied:
the statutes were supported by a substantial governmental
interest, and the restrictions were no more extensive than
necessary to serve that interest, which was to discourage
participating in lotteries in States that prohibited lotteries.
The court held, however, that the statutes, as applied to
Edge, did not directly advance the asserted governmental
interest, failed the Central Hudson test in this respect,
and hence could not be constitutionally applied to Edge.
A divided Court of Appeals, in an unpublished per curiam
opinion, affirmed in all respects, also rejecting the
Government's submission that the District Court had erred
in judging the validity of the statutes on an -as applied-
standard, that is, determining whether the statutes
directly served the governmental interest in a substantial
way solely on the effect of applying them to Edge.
  Because the court below declared a federal statute
unconstitutional and applied reasoning that was question-
able under our cases relating to the regulation of commer-
cial speech, we granted certiorari.  506 U. S. ___ (1992).
We reverse.
                           II
  The Government argues first that gambling implicates
no constitutionally protected right, but rather falls within
a category of activities normally considered to be -vices,-
and that the greater power to prohibit gambling necessar-
ily includes the lesser power to ban its advertisement; it
argues that we therefore need not proceed with a Central
Hudson analysis.  The Court of Appeals did not address
this issue and neither do we, for the statutes are not
unconstitutional under the standards of Central Hudson
applied by the courts below.

                           III
  For most of this Nation's history, purely commercial
advertising was not considered to implicate the constitu-
tional protection of the First Amendment.  See Valentine
v. Chrestenson, 316 U. S. 52, 54 (1942).  In 1976, the
Court extended First Amendment protection to speech that
does no more than propose a commercial transaction.  See
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748 (1976).  Our
decisions, however, have recognized the -`common-sense'
distinction between speech proposing a commercial trans-
action, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to
government regulation, and other varieties of speech.-
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 455-456
(1978).  The Constitution therefore affords a lesser protec-
tion to commercial speech than to other constitutionally
guaranteed expression.  Board of Trustees of State Univ.
of New York v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 477 (1989); Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n,
supra, at 563; Ohralik, supra, at 456.
  In Central Hudson, we set out the general scheme for
assessing government restrictions on commercial speech.
Supra, at 566.  Like the courts below, we assume that
Edge, if allowed to, would air nonmisleading advertise-
ments about the Virginia lottery, a legal activity.  As to
the second Central Hudson factor, we are quite sure that
the Government has a substantial interest in supporting
the policy of nonlottery States, as well as not interfering
with the policy of States that permit lotteries.  As in
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of
Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. 328 (1986), the activity underlying
the relevant advertising-gambling-implicates no consti-
tutionally protected right; rather, it falls into a category
of -vice- activity that could be, and frequently has been,
banned altogether.  As will later be discussed, we also
agree that the statutes are no broader than necessary to
advance the Government's interest and hence the fourth
part of the Central Hudson test is satisfied.
  The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the District
Court's holding that the statutes were invalid because, as
applied to Edge, they failed to advance directly the
governmental interest supporting them.  According to the
Court of Appeals, whose judgment we are reviewing,  this
was because the 127,000 people who reside in Edge's nine-
county listening area in North Carolina receive most of
their radio, newspaper, and television communications
from Virginia-based media.  These North Carolina resi-
dents who might listen to Edge -are inundated with
Virginia's lottery advertisements- and hence, the court
stated, prohibiting Edge from advertising Virginia's lottery
-is ineffective in shielding North Carolina residents from
lottery information.-  This -ineffective or remote measure
to support North Carolina's desire to discourage gambling
cannot justify infringement upon commercial free speech.-
App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a, 7a.  In our judgment, the courts
below erred in that respect.

                            A
  The third Central Hudson factor asks whether the
-regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted.-  Central Hudson, 447 U. S., at 566.  It is
readily apparent that this question cannot be answered
by limiting the inquiry to whether the governmental
interest is directly advanced as applied to a single person
or entity.  Even if there were no advancement as applied
in that manner-in this case, as applied to Edge-there
would remain the matter of the regulation's general
application to others-in this case, to all other radio and
television stations in North Carolina and countrywide.
The courts below thus asked the wrong question in ruling
on the third Central Hudson factor.  This is not to say
that the validity of the statute's application to Edge is an
irrelevant inquiry, but that issue properly should be dealt
with under the fourth factor of the Central Hudson test.
As we have said, -[t]he last two steps of the Central
Hudson analysis basically involve a consideration of the
`fit' between the legislature's ends and the means chosen
to accomplish those ends.-  Posadas, supra, at 341.
  We have no doubt that the statutes directly advanced
the governmental interest at stake in this case.  In
response to the appearance of state-sponsored lotteries,
Congress might have continued to ban all radio or televi-
sion lottery advertisements, even by stations in States
that have legalized lotteries.  This it did not do.  Neither
did it permit stations such as Edge, located in a non-
lottery State, to carry lottery ads if their signals reached
into a State that sponsors lotteries; similarly, it did not
forbid stations in a lottery State such as Virginia from
carrying lottery ads if their signals reached into an
adjoining State such as North Carolina where lotteries
were illegal.  Instead of favoring either the lottery or the
nonlottery State, Congress opted to support the anti-
gambling policy of a State like North Carolina by forbid-
ding stations in such a State from airing lottery advertis-
ing.  At the same time it sought not to unduly interfere
with the policy of a lottery sponsoring State such as
Virginia.  Virginia could advertise its lottery through radio
and television stations licensed to Virginia locations, even
if their signals reached deep into North Carolina.  Con-
gress surely knew that stations in one State could often
be heard in another but expressly prevented each and
every North Carolina station, including Edge, from carry-
ing lottery ads.  Congress plainly made the commonsense
judgment that each North Carolina station would have an
audience in that State, even if its signal reached else-
where and that enforcing the statutory restriction would
insulate each station's listeners from lottery ads and hence
advance the governmental purpose of supporting North
Carolina's laws against gambling.  This congressional
policy of balancing the interests of lottery and nonlottery
States is the substantial governmental interest that
satisfies Central Hudson, the interest which the courts
below did not fully appreciate.  It is also the interest that
is directly served by applying the statutory restriction to
all stations in North Carolina; and this would plainly be
the case even if, as applied to Edge, there were only
marginal advancement of that interest.

                            B
  Left unresolved, of course, is the validity of applying the
statutory restriction to Edge, an issue that we now
address under the fourth Central Hudson factor, i.e.,
whether the regulation is more extensive than is
necessary to serve the governmental interest.  We revisited
that aspect of Central Hudson in Board of Trustees of
State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469 (1989), and
concluded that the validity of restrictions on commercial
speech should not be judged by standards more stringent
than those applied to expressive conduct entitled to full
First Amendment protection or to relevant time, place or
manner restrictions.  Id., at 477-478.  We made clear in
Fox that our commercial speech cases require a fit be-
tween the restriction and the government interest that is
not necessarily perfect, but reasonable.  Id., at 480.  This
was also the approach in Posadas, supra, at 344.
  We have no doubt that the fit in this case was a
reasonable one.  Although Edge was licensed to serve the
Elizabeth City area, it chose to broadcast from a more
northerly position, which allowed its signal to reach into
the Hampton Roads, Virginia, metropolitan area.  Allowing
it to carry lottery ads reaching over 90% of its listeners,
all in Virginia, would surely enhance its revenues.  But
just as surely, because Edge's signals with lottery ads
would be heard in the nine counties in North Carolina
that its broadcasts reached, this would be in derogation
of the substantial federal interest in supporting North
Carolina's laws making lotteries illegal.  In this posture,
to prevent Virginia's lottery policy from dictating what
stations in a neighboring State may air, it is reasonable
to require Edge to comply with the restriction against
carrying lottery advertising.  In other words, applying the
restriction to a broadcaster such as Edge directly advances
the governmental interest in enforcing the restriction in
nonlottery States, while not interfering with the policy of
lottery States like Virginia.  We think this would be the
case even if it were true, which it is not, that applying
the general statutory restriction to Edge, in isolation,
would no more than marginally insulate the North Caro-
linians in the North Carolina counties served by Edge
from hearing lottery ads.
  In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781 (1989),
we dealt with a time, place, or manner restriction that re-
quired the city to control the sound level of musical
concerts in a city park, concerts that were fully protected
by the First Amendment.  We held there that the require-
ment of narrow tailoring was met if -the . . . regulation
promotes a substantial government interest that would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation,- provided
that it did not burden substantially more speech than
necessary to further the government's legitimate interests.
Id., at 799.  In the course of upholding the restriction, we
went on to say that -the validity of the regulation depends
on the relation it bears to the overall problem the govern-
ment seeks to correct, not on the extent to which it
furthers the government's interest in an individual case.-
Id., at 801.
  The Ward holding is applicable here, for we have
observed that the validity of time, place, or manner
restrictions is determined under standards very similar to
those applicable in the commercial speech context and
that it would be incompatible with the subordinate
position of commercial speech in the scale of First Amend-
ment values to apply a more rigid standard to commercial
speech than is applied to fully protected speech.  Fox,
supra at 477, 478.  Ward thus teaches us that we judge
the validity of the restriction in this case by the relation
it bears to the general problem of accommodating the
policies of both lottery and nonlottery States, not by the
extent to which it furthers the Government's interest in
an individual case.
  This is consistent with the approach we have taken in
the commercial speech context.  In Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Assn., 436 U. S., at 462, for example, an attorney
attacked the validity of a rule against solicitatation -not
facially, but as applied to his acts of solicitation.-  We
rejected the appellant's view that his -as applied- chal-
lenge required the State to show that his particular
conduct in fact trenched on the interests that the regula-
tion sought to protect.  We stated that in the general
circumstances of the appellant's acts, the State had -a
strong interest in adopting and enforcing rules of conduct
designed to protect the public.-  Id., at 464.  This having
been established, the State was entitled to protect its
interest by applying a prophylactic rule to those circum-
stances generally; we declined to require the State to go
further and to prove that the state interests supporting
the rule actually were advanced by applying the rule in
Ohralik's particular case.
  Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U. S. ___ (1993), is not to the
contrary.  While treating Fane's claim as an as applied
challenge to a broad category of commercial solicitation,
we did not suggest that Fane could challenge the regula-
tion on commercial speech as applied only to himself or
his own acts of solicitation.

                            C
  We also believe that the courts below were wrong in
holding that as applied to Edge itself, the restriction at
issue was ineffective and gave only remote support to the
Government's interest.
  As we understand it, both the Court of Appeals and the
District Court recognized that Edge's potential North
Carolina audience was the 127,000 residents of nine North
Carolina counties, that enough of them regularly or from
time to time listen to Edge to account for 11% of all radio
listening in those counties, and that while listening to
Edge they heard no lottery advertisements.  It could
hardly be denied, and neither court below purported to
deny, that these facts, standing alone, would clearly show
that applying the statutory restriction to Edge would
directly serve the statutory purpose of supporting North
Carolina's antigambling policy by excluding invitations to
gamble from 11% of the radio listening time in the nine-
county area.  Without more, this result could hardly be
called either -ineffective,- -remote,- or -conditional,- see
Central Hudson, 447 U. S., at 564, 569.  Nor could it be
called only -limited incremental support,- Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Product Corp., 463  U. S. 60, 73 (1983), for the
Government interest, or thought to furnish only specula-
tive or marginal support.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a, 25a.
Otherwise, any North Carolina radio station with 127,000
or fewer potential listeners would be permitted to carry
lottery ads because of its marginal significance in serving
the State's interest.
  Of course, both courts below pointed out, and rested
their judgment on the fact, that the 127,000 people in
North Carolina who might listen to Edge also listened to
Virginia radio stations and television stations that regu-
larly carried lottery ads.  Virginia newspapers carrying
such material also were available to them.  This exposure,
the courts below thought, was sufficiently pervasive to
prevent the restriction on Edge from furnishing any more
than ineffective or remote support for the statutory
purpose.  We disagree with this conclusion because in
light of the facts relied on, it represents too limited a
view of what amounts to direct advancement of the
governmental interest that is present in this case.
  Even if all of the residents of Edge's North Carolina
service area listen to lottery ads from Virginia stations,
it would still be true that 11% of radio listening time in
that area would remain free of such material.  If Edge is
allowed to advertise the Virginia lottery, the percentage
of listening time carrying such material would increase
from 38% to 49%.  We do not think that Central Hudson
compels us to consider this consequence to be without
significance.
  The Court of Appeals indicated that Edge's potential
audience of 127,000 persons were -inundated- by the
Virginia media carrying lottery advertisements.  But the
District Court found that only 38% of all radio listening
in the nine-county area was directed at stations that
broadcast lottery advertising.  With respect to television,
the District Court observed that American adults spend
60% of their media consumption time listening to televi-
sion.  The evidence before it also indicated that in four
of the nine counties served by Edge, 75% of all television
viewing was directed at Virginia stations; in three others,
the figure was between 50 and 75%; and in the remaining
two counties, between 25 and 50%.  Even if it is assumed
that all of these stations carry lottery advertising, it is
very likely that a great many people in the nine-county
area are exposed to very little or no lottery advertising
carried on television.  Virginia newspapers are also
circulated in Edge's area, 10,400 daily and 12,500 on
Sundays, hardly enough to constitute a pervasive exposure
to lottery advertising, even on the unlikely assumption
that the readers of those newspapers always look for and
read the lottery ads.  Thus the District Court observed
only that -a significant number of residents of [the nine-
county] area listens to- Virginia radio and television
stations and read Virginia newspapers.  App. to Pet. for
Cert. 25a (emphasis added).
  Moreover, to the extent that the courts below assumed
that 1304 and 1307 would have to effectively shield
North Carolina residents from information about lotteries
to advance their purpose, they were mistaken.  As the
Government asserts, the statutes were not -adopt[ed] . . .
to keep North Carolina residents ignorant of the Virginia
Lottery for ignorance's sake,- but to accommodate non-
lottery States' interest in discouraging public participation
in lotteries, even as they accommodate the countervailing
interests of lottery States.  Reply Brief for Petitioners 11.
Within the bounds of the general protection provided by
the Constitution to commercial speech, we allow room for
legislative judgments.  Fox, 492 U. S., at 480.  Here, as
in Posadas de Puerto Rico, the Government obviously
legislated on the premise that the advertising of gambling
serves to increase the demand for the advertised product.
See Posadas, 478 U. S., at 344.  See also Central Hudson,
supra, at 569.  Congress clearly was entitled to determine
that broadcast of promotional advertising of lotteries
undermines North Carolina's policy against gambling, even
if the North Carolina audience is not wholly unaware of
the lottery's existence.  Congress has, for example, alto-
gether banned the broadcast advertising of cigarettes, even
though it could hardly have believed that this regulation
would keep the public wholly ignorant of the availability
of cigarettes.  See 15 U. S. C. 1335.  See also
Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 69
Ohio St. 2d 361, 366, 433 N. E. 138, 142 (Ohio) app.
dism'd for want of a substantial federal question, 459
U. S. 807 (1982) (alcohol advertising).  Nor do we require
that the Government make progress on every front before
it can make progress on any front.  If there is an immedi-
ate connection between advertising and demand, and the
federal regulation decreases advertising, it stands to
reason that the policy of decreasing demand for gambling
is correspondingly advanced.  Accordingly, the Government
may be said to advance its purpose by substantially
reducing lottery advertising, even where it is not wholly
eradicated.
  Thus, even if it were proper to conduct a Central
Hudson analysis of the statutes only as applied to Edge,
we would not agree with the courts below that the restric-
tion at issue here, which prevents Edge from broadcasting
lottery advertising to its sizable radio audience in North
Carolina, is rendered ineffective by the fact that Virginia
radio and television programs can be heard in North
Carolina.  In our view, the restriction, even as applied
only to Edge, directly advances the governmental interest
within the meaning of Central Hudson.

                            D
  Nor need we be blind to the practical effect of adopting
respondent's view of the level of particularity of analysis
appropriate to decide its case.  Assuming for the sake of
argument that Edge had a valid claim that the statutes
violated Central Hudson only as applied to it, the piece-
meal approach it advocates would act to vitiate the
Government's ability generally to accommodate States with
differing policies.  Edge has chosen to transmit from a
location near the border between two jurisdictions with
different rules, and rests its case on the spillover from the
jurisdiction across the border.  Were we to adopt Edge's
approach, we would treat a station that is close to the
line as if it were on the other side of it, effectively
extending the legal regime of Virginia inside North
Carolina.  One result of holding for Edge on this basis
might well be that additional North Carolina communities,
farther from the Virginia border, would receive broadcast
lottery advertising from Edge.  Broadcasters licensed to
these communities, as well as other broadcasters serving
Elizabeth City, would then be able to complain that
lottery advertising from Edge and other similar broadcast-
ers renders the federal statute ineffective as applied to
them.  Because the approach Edge advocates has no
logical stopping point once state boundaries are ignored,
this process might be repeated until the policy of support-
ing North Carolina's ban on lotteries would be seriously
eroded.  We are unwilling to start down that road.

                           IV
  Because the statutes challenged here regulate commer-
cial speech in a manner that does not violate the First
Amendment, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

                                              Reversed.